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The Impact of Entitlement programs on Employment and Its Interaction with 
Social Heterogeneity in OECD Countries: an Empirical Study Based on a Dynamic 
Panel Model 
 
HONG DING 
Abstract 
 
Using a dynamic panel model and two estimators: Arellano-Bond estimator and 
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator, this paper provides empirical evidences 
to support the hypothesis that expenditure on entitlement programs increases voluntary 
and involuntary unemployment, decreases labor participation rate and investment rate. 
For the impacts on employment rate and unemployment rate, welfare spending is found 
to have interaction with ethnic fractionalization index, supporting the hypothesis that 
higher social heterogeneity in terms of ethnic, racial, language and cultural backgrounds 
may strengthen the effects of entitlement programs on employment. However, this 
interaction effect is not present in Nordic countries, possibly due to the low social 
heterogeneity in these countries, which suggests that seemingly successful Nordic model 
may not be copied to other developed countries with higher social heterogeneity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"No country, however rich, can afford the waste of its human resources. Demoralization 
caused by vast unemployment is our greatest extravagance. Morally, it is the greatest 
menace to our social order." 
------Franklin Roosevelt 
 
 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
Economists like to show that intuition is wrong. Intuition is, of course, not always wrong. 
This paper is aimed at testing a set of hypotheses based on intuition and observation 
about how entitlement programs impact on employment by using a dynamic panel model. 
It is hypothesized that entitlement programs induce higher unemployment through the 
following channels: 
A.  Increase voluntary unemployment: Entitlement programs raise the opportunity 
cost of working thus providing disincentive to work and incentive to depend on 
government welfare. In addition to the people who choose to leave labor market 
and  depend  on  welfare  system,  it  is  expected  that  the  incentive  effect  of 
entitlement programs is more prominently displayed in creating a group of “fake” 
job seekers whose real goal of looking for jobs is not working but meeting the 
eligibility requirements of unemployment benefit programs. Because of the 
existence of this group of fake job seekers, a large proportion of people who 
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would  have  left  labor  force  if  unemployment  insurance  programs  had  no 
eligibility requirements choose to stay in labor force by continuing job-hunting. 
B.  Increase involuntary unemployment: Entitlement programs increase labor costs to 
firms thus decreasing job opportunities by inhibiting business investments. 
C.  Decrease labor participation rate: In addition to the people voluntarily choosing 
the life style of depending on entitlement programs, as mentioned in hypothesis A, 
discouraged workers may give up job hunting for losing hope of finding job. 
D.  The effect of entitlement programs on employment may have interaction with 
social heterogeneity: higher social heterogeneity in terms of ethnic, racial, 
language, religion and cultural backgrounds may strengthen the effects A and C 
above. In a more socially diversified society, it is more likely that people with one 
ethnic or cultural background take advantage of another group of people with 
different ethnic or cultural background in terms of wealth re-distribution. So the 
disincentive effect of entitlement programs may be higher in economy with higher 
social heterogeneity, which, however, is not expected to affect the investment 
effect of B. 
 
PAST THEROY AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
What is the impact of welfare spending on employment? As Disney (2000) pointed out, 
in a Keynesian setting, a tax-financed increase in welfare spending should have a modest 
expansionary impact on employment and output, so long as there are spare resources. In a 
static New Classical model, in contrast, such public spending can completely displace 
private spending. The impact of taxes levied on labor on the “equilibrium” or “natural” 
rate of output then depends on the net-of-tax replacement rate of earnings to out-of-work 
benefits. 
 
Alesina and Perotti (1994) used a general equilibrium, two-country model with 
exportables, importables and nontradables to study government redistribution across 
different types of agents in a world characterized by the presence of labor unions and 
distortionary taxation and reveal that an increase in transfers to, say, retirees, financed by 
distortionary taxation, can generate a loss of competitiveness (defined as an increase in 
relative unit labor costs for tradable goods), an appreciation of the relative price of 
nontradables, and a decrease in employment in all sectors of the domestic economy. The 
same qualitative effects would also obtain in the case of an increase in transfers towards 
the unemployed even if financed by non-distortionary taxation. 
 
As for the empirical literature on this impact, despite a large volume of literature on the 
relationship between tax rate or tax/GDP ratio and employment/unemployment rate, there 
are actually few studies investigating the impacts of welfare spending-to-GDP ratio or the 
components of welfare spending.  The closet concept examined in the previous literature 
on macroeconomic findings on welfare spending is benefit replacement rate, which can 
indirectly reflect the size of the expenditure on entitlement programs.   For example, 
Layard  et.  al.  (1991)  found  that  between  1956-59  and  1981-87,  the  rise  in  the 
replacement rate of Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits to earnings raised 
unemployment rate by 1.12 percentage points. The empirical study of Nickell (1997) 
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gives a conclusion that high unemployment is associated with four labor market features. 
Two of them are 1) generous unemployment benefits that are allowed to run on 
indefinitely, combined with little or no pressure on the unemployed to obtain work and 
low levels of active intervention to increase the ability and willingness of the unemployed 
to work; 2) high overall taxes impinging on labor or a combination of high minimum 
wages for young people associated with high payroll taxes. However, he also points out 
that if generous levels of unemployment benefit are accompanied by pressure on the 
unemployed to take jobs, for example, fixing the duration of benefit and providing 
resources to raise the ability/willingness of the unemployed to takes jobs, then they do 
not appear to have serious implications for average levels of unemployment. 
Nickell (2003) finds that a 10 percentage point rise in the tax wedge will reduce overall 
labour input provided via the market by around 2 per cent of the population of working age. 
However, tax rate differentials only explain a minority of the market work differentials, the 
majority can be explained by other relevant labour market institutions. Particularly important 
are the differences in social security systems which provide income support to various non- 
working groups including the unemployed, the sick and disabled, and the early retired. 
Similarly, Scarpetta (1996) found that a 1% increase in the replacement rate raises 
unemployment rate by 0.13%. However, as far as the author’s knowledge, there is no 
empirical study specifically examining the impact of welfare expenditure scale (relative 
to GDP) on employment. This paper fills in this blank by using an econometric technique 
never  used  before  on  this  topic.  Additionally,  it  presents  also  total  government 
expenditure  (as  percentage  of  GDP)  as  a  measure  for  general  government  size  in 
economy for comparison as welfare spending is a part of it. 
 
 
 
ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
 
As Disney (2000) pointed out, there are some limitations of the preceding empirical 
studies on this topic. One problem is some of them (for example, Tullio (1987)) have not 
fully developed model in the sense that the model specification has not enough covariates 
or proper functional form so that adding additional variables or imposing some structure 
on the model would be likely to quickly reduce the significance of the tax and spending 
effects on growth and employment. In addition, the possibility of endogeneity (of welfare 
spending levels to employment) is rarely discussed in these macroeconomic literatures. 
To address this, this paper applies an econometric technique that was never used on this 
topic previously and can take into account endogeneity of welfare variables on a fully 
developed  dynamic  panel  data  model,  which  includes  most  commonly  included 
covariates in previous empirical literature on employment. 
 
Another key issue in the previous studies is that most of them are not based on real panel 
data. For example, all five studies summarized in Disney (2000)’s Table 2 did not use 
either fixed effect for country-specific heterogeneity or fixed effect for common 
macroeconomic shocks, rather, countries were grouped so that the groups appear to have 
common characteristics, which are somewhat arbitrary and of limited use since there is 
no real time variation in them, or alternatively, each year was treated as a separate, 
independent  observation  in  a  pooled  time  series-cross  section  data  set.  The  latter 
approach, as Nickell (1997) pointed out, almost certainly violates the assumption of 
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independent random draws and therefore the model should not be estimated by OLS (as 
Alesina and Perotti (1997) did). Some studies circumvented this by using period averages, 
as a result most part of time variation information was lost and power of the studies was 
severely compromised. Based on the above-mentioned limitations and defects, Disney 
(2000) concludes that despite a general presumption of adverse impact from welfare 
spending, there is no clear cut empirical evidence from cross-country comparisons in 
support of this general proposition. 
 
To correct for these problems, I construct a dynamic panel model including two-way 
fixed effects for both cross-section variation and time variation. Particularly, as this paper 
uses the most recent, complete and comprehensive database of welfare expenditure of 
OECD countries up to now, most variables have the longest time ranges and all 34, rather 
than part of OECD countries are included, compared to previous literature on this topic, 
providing the highest variations in both cross-section and time (refer to Appendix 1 for 
time coverage of most variables). 
 
More importantly, for the first time, this paper explicitly takes into account dynamic 
nature of the fixed effect model for panel data of employment/unemployment rate. The 
reason why a dynamic model is needed is that this kind of dependent variables related to 
labor market condition is likely to have high persistence. As Bernal-Verdugo et. al. (2012) 
point out, it is important to note that there is high persistence of unemployment rates. 
According  to  their  estimation  results,  a  one  percentage  point  increase  in  previous 
unemployment  translates  into  a  0.83  percentage  point  higher  unemployment  in  the 
current  period,  which  can  be  dubbed  as  a  “momentum”  effect  of  pre-existing 
unemployment rate levels. OECD (2006) also indicates that a macroeconomic shock 
might not only raise current unemployment but, in addition, its effects might persist over 
time. 
 
The introduction of dynamic panel model, specifically, the addition of lagged value of 
dependent variable in ordinary panel model makes it necessary to use two estimators 
specifically developed to estimate this kind of model. As Roodman (2007) pointed out, 
the Arellano-Bond (1991) and Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998) dynamic 
panel estimators are two popular estimators designed for situations with 1) “small T, 
large N” panels, meaning few time periods and many entities; 2) a linear functional 
relationship; 3) a single left-hand-side variable that is dynamic, depending on its own past 
realizations; 4) independent variables that are not strictly exogenous, meaning correlated 
with past and possibly current realizations of the error; 5) fixed entity effects and/or time 
effects; and 6) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals, but not across 
them. Arellano-Bond estimation starts by transforming all regressors, usually by 
differencing, and uses the Generalized Method of Moments (Hansen (1982)), and so is 
called “difference GMM”. 
 
The Arellano-Bond estimator forms moment conditions in which lagged-levels of the 
dependent variable and the predetermined variables are orthogonal to first-differences of 
the disturbances.  The Arellano Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator augments Arellano-Bond 
by making an additional assumption, that first differences of instrumenting variables are 
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uncorrelated with the fixed effects, which can form additional moment conditions in 
which lagged differences of the dependent variable are orthogonal to levels of the 
disturbances. This allows the introduction of more instruments, and can dramatically 
improve efficiency. 
 
The robust estimates of the coefficient standard errors assume no correlation across 
individuals in the idiosyncratic disturbances. Time dummies make this assumption more 
likely to hold. If a regressor is endogenous, standard treatment is to use lags two and 
deeper of the regressor as instrument variable. 
 
One advantage of using both estimators is to use both as a validator of each other. Only 
when two estimators are consistent can we say the result is robust and reliable. We take 
inconsistent but significant results between two estimators as insufficient evidence to 
establish significant effect. 
 
 
 
THE WELFARE AND THE DATA 
 
The “welfare” in the concept of welfare state or welfare spending used in this paper refers 
to public social spending, which measures the amount of resources committed by the 
government  in  the  areas  of  pensions,  benefits  (social  support),  health  and  other 
entitlement programs that are not direct transfer payment. A traditional argument for 
much social public spending is to prevent disadvantage and thus enhance equity. 
This study is based on a panel model of all 34 OECD member states: The OECD Social 
Expenditure   Database.   Social   expenditure   is   classified   as   public   when   general 
government (i.e. central administration, local governments and social security institutions) 
controls the financial flows. For example, sickness benefits financed  by compulsory 
contributions from employers and employees to social insurance funds are considered 
“public”, whereas sickness benefits paid directly by employers to their employees are 
classified as “private”. 
 
According to this data, public social expenditure averaged 19% of GDP across 34 OECD 
countries in 2007. Country differences in spending levels were wide. Mexico and Korea 
spent between 6 and 10% of GDP. France and Sweden spent about 20 percentage points 
more. Public spending is a feature of the continental European countries although USA is 
also catching up in the ratio of public welfare spending to GDP. Between 1982 and 2007, 
this ratio has risen by 2.5 percentage points on average across all OECD countries. 
According  to  OECD  (2011),  countries  with  a  more  equal  income  distribution,  as 
measured by the Gini coefficient, tended to have higher social spending, however, bigger 
rises in social spending experienced over the last generation in some countries do not 
appear to have contributed to reductions in income inequality. 
 
As for the composition of welfare expenditure, the largest category of public social 
spending concerns old-age and survivor pensions: on average across the OECD, 
amounting to almost 7% of GDP. On average across the OECD, income transfers to the 
working-age population amounted to almost 5% of GDP, and within the latter category, 
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public spending targeted to families with children and to persons on unemployment 
benefits each represented nearly 1.3% of GDP. On average public expenditure on health 
services amounted to 6% of GDP in 2003 while spending on other social services was 
about 2% of GDP. 
 
The variables used in this paper, data source and time coverage of each variable are 
presented in Appendix 1. Four variables are used to represent welfare state: public social 
welfare expenditure as a percentage of GDP (public_social) and four components of it: 1) 
income support to households which do not have sufficient other resources to support 
themselves identified by government (income_support), 2) pension expenditure to the 
old-age and survivor (pension_exp), 3) public expenditure on health services (health_exp) 
and 4) spending on other social services (otherwelf). All the welfare measures are in 
percentage of GDP. 
 
Welfare expenditure rate is a better measure for welfare state or entitlement society than 
government consumption as percentage of GDP because government purchases of goods 
and services for citizens financed by tax may have significant externality benefits (for 
example,  through  education  and  R&D)  while  welfare  spending  is  more  relevant  to 
transfer payment part of government spending, which is more likely to affect individual’s 
incentive to work or individual firm’s incentive to make investment. Therefore welfare 
spending rate is a better measure for non-productive effect of government intervention in 
economy, which is the interest of this paper. Government expenditure rate, however is a 
more  general  measure  of  the  scale  of  welfare  state  or  entitlement  society,  which 
represents the overall net impact of government intervention in economy and will also be 
presented for comparison. 
 
The main data source of welfare expenditure and its components, OECD Social 
Expenditure database covers the years 1980 – 2010. Over this period, public social 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, on average across OECD, increased from 15.6% to 
19.2%. Public pension spending (6.4% of GDP) and public health expenditure (5.8% of 
GDP) are the largest social spending items (Adema et. al. (2001)). The data of welfare 
variables between 2008 and 2012 are projected by OECD. 
 
 
 
THE MODEL 
 
The model in this paper is a dynamic panel model containing moving-average serial 
correlation (MA1) in the residuals: 
yit = αyit −1 + βxit  + δzit  + ci  + θt  + ε it  + γεit −1 (1) 
 
where ε it are assumed to be independent and identically distributed, xit is assumed to be 
strictly exogenous and zit is assumed to be endogenous. 
First-differencing the model equation yields 
∆yit = α∆yit −1 + β∆xit  + δ∆zit  + ∆θt  + ∆ε it  + γ∆ε it −1 
 
 
(2) 
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Lagging the level equation three periods shows that only ε it −3 and ε it − 4 appear in the 
equation for yit −3 , So yit −3 is a valid instrument for the current differenced equation. An 
analogous argument works for higher lags of y.  Similarly, because 
δzit − 2 = yit − 2 −αyit −3 − βxit − 2 − ci  − θt − 2 − ε it − 2 − γεit −3 
 
 
(3) 
 
only ε it − 2  and ε it −3  appear in the equation for zit − 2 , So zit − 2  is a valid instrument for the 
current differenced equation.    Lags two or higher of z are valid instruments for the 
differenced composite errors. For the Arellano-Bond estimator, we will use lags three or 
higher of y and lags two or higher of z in differenced equation. For Arellano 
Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator, in addition to these two moment conditions, we will use 
lagged differences of y and z as instruments in level equation. 
 
Specifically for out study, yit is a set of dependent variables concerning employment and 
 
investment, including  employment rate, unemployment rate , labor participation rate and 
investment rate (investment-to-GDP ratio) for country i at time t. xit is 1 x 4 vector and 
contains 4 observable explanatory variables which are assumed to be strictly exogenous, 
including  labor  productivity  growth  rate  (labor_prodg),  inflation  rate  (inflation),  , 
international trade openness (trade_open) and population density (popd). zit is a vector of 
explanatory variables which are assumed to be endogenous: one of five welfare measures 
(public_social, pension_exp, health_exp, income_support and otherwelf), and long real 
interest rate (long_real_r). ci 
 
represents country fixed effects that capture unobserved 
country-specific determinants of the dependent variable, which may include some 
variables with high time constancy, such as national cultural attitude(tradition) towards 
trade-off between work and leisure or national cultural attitude towards importance of 
equality of result or equality of opportunity. θ t is a fixed effect term for aggregate time, 
which captures global trend of some growth determinants that are common to all OECD 
countries,  such  as  worldwide technology progress  or  global  economic  downturns  or 
booms. ε it  + γε it −1 is a composite idiosyncratic error, which absorbs some time-varying 
omitted variables, such as home ownership (as pointed out by OECD (2006, p218), Home 
ownership is correlated with unemployment). 
 
The reason why a composite residual containing moving-average serial correlation (MA1) 
is specified in the model is because Arellano-Bond estimator requires that there be no 
autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors. Since this assumption is often violated in real 
data for employment and investment rate, a composite residual ε it  + γε it −1 is explicitly 
 
modeled  so  that  as  long  as ε it  has  no  autocorrelation,  our  model  allows  for  some 
autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors. 
 
The reason why welfare variables are assumed to be endogenous is that it is likely that 
changes in unemployment or economic growth induce changes in welfare spending. 
Following  the  financial  crisis  in  2007-2008,  more  unemployed  people  claimed  UI 
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benefits or food stamps in the US than pre-crisis period thus government expenditure on 
entitlement programs expanded rapidly. For example, according to an April 2012 report 
from the Congressional Budget Office, food stamps enrollment increased by 70 percent 
between 2007 and 2011. So welfare variables may receive feedback effect from 
employment: higher unemployment and lower business investment indicate bad economy, 
fewer job opportunities and lower income for working people, so it may induce higher 
level of dependence on entitlement programs. 
 
The reason why long term interest rate is assumed to be endogenous is that government 
tends to respond to the fluctuation of business cycles by adjusting interest rate. So when 
unemployment is high and investment is low, central bank tends to act to lower interest 
rate, which affects long term real interest rate. This reverse causality makes the strict 
exogeneity assumption for long term real interest rate unreasonable. 
 
The choice of three control variables (labor_prodg, inflation, long_real_r) closely follows 
IMF (2003) and OECD (2006). The inclusion of trade openness and population density as 
control variables for employment variables follows Bernal-Verdugo et. al.(2012). 
Felbermayr et. al. (2009) also find that higher trade openness is causally associated to a 
lower structural rate of unemployment. 
 
Factors  that  have  contributed  to  lowering  average  hours  worked  per  person  in 
employment per year are expected to include: 
 
• Technological  advances  in  efficiency  such  as  mechanization,  robotics  and 
information technology, which is measured by labor productivity growth rate 
(labor_prodg) 
• The increase of women equally participating in making income as opposed to 
previously being commonly bound to homemaking and childrearing exclusively, 
which is measured by labor participation rate (labor_parti) 
• Dropping fertility rates leading to less hours needed to be worked to support 
children, which is measured by fertility rate (fertility) 
 
The  hypothesis  A  is  tested  by  applying  model  (1)  and  choosing yit =hours, xit 
={labor_prodg, inflation, l.wageg, fertility, labor_parti}, zit ={l.hours, one of five welfare 
variables or govexp}. That is, working incentive is measured by hours actually worked, 
the set of exogenous explanatory variables includes labor productivity growth, inflation 
rate, one year lagged value of growth rate of labor compensation per unit labor input, 
fertility rate and labor participation rate. The set of endogenous variables include the 
lagged value of hours and one of five welfare variables or government expenditure-GDP 
ratio, which is used to compare the economic impacts between entitlement program 
expenditure and general government expenditure. 
 
The  hypothesis  B  is  tested  by  applying  model  (1)  and  choosing yit  =invrate, xit 
={  inflation,  long_real_r,  l.gdpg}, zit  ={l.invrate,  one  of  five  welfare  variables  or 
govexp}. That is, business investment is measured by investment rate (investment-to- 
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GDP ratio),  the set of exogenous explanatory variables includes inflation rate, long term 
real interest rate and one year lagged value of GDP growth rate. The set of endogenous 
variables include the lagged value of investment rate and one of five welfare variables or 
government expenditure-GDP ratio. 
 
Unemployment in economics sense cannot always be measured by unemployment rate. 
Unemployment consists of voluntary unemployment and involuntary unemployment. 
Voluntary unemployment is due to the people who give up seeking job and entirely 
depend on entitlement programs, which are not counted in unemployment rate, and those 
“fake” job seekers mentioned in hypothesis A who are looking for jobs only for meeting 
eligibility criterions of unemployment insurance programs, which are counted in 
unemployment rate.  Unemployment rate can measure the latter but not the former for the 
part of voluntary unemployment. One part of the former is conventionally referred as 
“discouraged workers” who give up job hunting for losing hope. The other part of the 
former is the people who voluntarily choose to leave labor force and depend on welfare 
programs after cost-benefit calculation. Involuntary unemployment can be measured by 
unemployment rate and is caused by the gap between labor demand and labor supply, or 
essentially the lack of job opportunities created by businesses. 
 
Because of the fact that unemployment rate is impacted by part of voluntary and all of 
involuntary unemployment, the hypothesis A and B will also be tested by applying model 
(1)  and choosing yit  =unemp, xit  ={labor_prodg,  inflation, trade_open,  popd}, zit 
={l.unemp,  long_real_r , one of five welfare variables or govexp}. That is, the dependent 
variable  is  unemployment  rate,  the  set  of  exogenous  explanatory  variables  includes 
growth rate of labor productivity, inflation rate, trade openness (foreign trade-to-GDP 
ratio) and population density.  The set of endogenous variables includes the lagged value 
of unemployment rate, long-term real interest rate and one of five welfare variables or 
government expenditure-to-GDP ratio. 
Because unemployment rate can only measure part of voluntary unemployment, it is not a 
precise measure of labor market condition. Employment rate is free of this defect as it 
measures the proportion of the country's working-age population (ages 15 to 64 in most 
OECD countries) that is employed. In other words, when calculating employment rate, 
the denominator includes people that have stopped looking for work. In contrast, when 
computing unemployment rate, both numerator and denominator do not include people 
that have stopped looking for work. To use this better measure of labor market condition, 
I also test the Hypothesis A and B by applying model (1) by choosing yit =employrate, 
xit ={labor_prodg, inflation,  trade_open, popd}, zit ={l.unemp,  long_real_r , one of five 
welfare variables or govexp} where employrate is employment rate. 
 
To specifically test the impact of entitlement programs on the number of discouraged 
workers and  people who voluntarily choose to leave labor force and depend on welfare 
programs after cost-benefit calculation, I also test the Hypothesis C by applying model (1) 
by  choosing yit =labor_parti, xit ={labor_prodg,  inflation, trade_open,  popd}, zit 
={l.unemp,  long_real_r , one of five welfare variables or govexp} where labor_parti is 
labor participation rate,   the ratio between the labor force and the overall size of their 
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cohort (national population of the same age range). It should be noted that the separate 
effect of entitlement programs on the number of “fake” job seekers cannot be tested as 
there is no official statistic on this part of population: they are counted as labor force, 
they are not working and they do not want to work, the only reason that they are looking 
for work is for keep unemployment welfare benefits. In the long run, as UI expires, this 
part of population will transition into non-labor-force population, i.e., people that have 
stopped looking for job. 
 
The hypothesis D is tested by adding one interaction term between one welfare variable 
and ethnic fractionalization index from Alesina et. al. (2003), into the dynamic panel 
estimations mentioned above. If the interaction term is significant, then the Hypothesis D 
is supported. 
 
The supporters of welfare state or entitlement society often use Nordic countries (Norway, 
Sweden,  Denmark,  Finland  and  Iceland)  as  a  success  model.  To  test  whether  the 
preceding hypotheses also apply to Nordic countries and whether they have some unique 
features that may not be replicable across countries, I also conduct sub-sample analysis 
using the same estimation approach. 
 
 
 
RESULT 
 
Table 1A through Table 9_1B present the estimation results for model (1) using two 
estimators:  Arellano-Bond  estimator  and  Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond  system 
estimator. All regressions include dummy variables for both countries and years, the 
estimates for which are not shown to save space. The numbers in parenthesis are robust 
standard errors. 
 
Table 1A and 1B confirm that two components of welfare expenditure have negative 
impacts on hours worked per year per person in employment: income support, public 
health service, therefore the total welfare-to-GDP ratio has a significant negative effect 
on hours worked. This supports disincentive effect in Hypothesis A. 
 
Interestingly, Table 1_1A and 1_1B for sub-sample analysis of Nordic countries give us 
an opposite result: except the welfare spending rate for public health and other social 
services, all welfare variables have significant POSITIVE effect on the measure of 
working incentive (hours). This difference in effect on hours worked is likely to have 
something to do with cultural attitude towards work in Nordic countries, which, however, 
is supposed to have time constancy and captured largely by fixed effect of country in 
model (1). The hypothesis D suggests that social homogeneity is also likely to play a role 
here.   The average ethnic fractionalization index of all non-Nordic OECD countries is 
0.2672 while that of Nordic countries is 0.0824. The non-Nordic OECD nations have 
more than three times higher ethnic fractionalization index, suggesting a much more 
diversified ethnic , racial , language and cultural backgrounds than these five small 
Northern European nations. The ethnic fractionalization of USA is 0.4901, about six 
times of that of Nordic countries. If it does affect the impact of entitlement programs on 
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employment, i.e., it does have interaction with welfare expenditure in the dynamic model 
of employment/unemployment rate, then Nordic model cannot be copied to USA. In fact, 
the welfare state model of Nordic countries is not replicable even in most European 
nations, which is practically proved by the current European Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
 
Table 2A and 2B confirm that three components of welfare expenditure have negative 
impact on employment rate: income support, pension benefit and public health service, 
therefore the total welfare-to-GDP ratio has a significant negative effect on employment 
rate too, supporting the Hypotheis B. It is also noted that government expenditure-to- 
GDP  ratio  has  similar  impact  on  employment  rate.  The  insignificant  estimate  for 
otherwelf (welfare expenditure ratio for other public social services provided by 
government) implies that not all components of spending on entitlement programs are 
harmful for employment rate. For example, as Nickell (1997) pointed out, welfare 
spending by government that provides resources to raise the ability/willingness of the 
unemployed to takes jobs has no negative impact on employment. However, three biggest 
components mentioned above do induce lower proportion of employment in population, 
as evidenced by both Arellano-Bond and Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system 
estimators. Interestingly, Table 2_1A and 2_1B show a similar pattern for the sub-sample 
of Nordic countries. This finding implies that Nordic nations could have performed better 
if they had lower level of welfare spending. Their overall seemingly better performance 
on employment, compared with other EU nations is not attributed to the feature of high 
welfare expenditure in Nordic model but something else. The impact of spending on 
entitlement programs on employment rate estimated from the data of all OECD countries 
suggests that if current rising trend of entitlement programs in most developed countries 
maintains,  the proportion of working population in total population will keep falling, 
making long term fiscal sustainability increasingly fragile.  Even the presently seemingly 
healthy Nordic economies will not be immune to this danger in the long run.   As 
establishment of entitlement programs have high policy rigidity politically, this danger 
will be more and more prominent and imminent with time. 
 
Table 3A and 3B indicate that welfare spending on income support and public health 
services does interact with ethnic fractionalization index, validating the Hypothesis D. As 
expected, the interaction term has the same sign with that of welfare variable, suggesting 
that ethnic diversity enhances the negative effect of welfare spending on employment. 
This implies that the quantitative effect of welfare spending may be hard to estimate as a 
variety of interactions may not be taken into account when we only estimate the main 
effect of a welfare variable. 
 
As a comparison, two estimators are not consistent for Nordic countries when interaction 
term is included, as shown in Table 3_1A and 3_1B, so we have no robust evidence to 
support a significant interaction effect between welfare spending rate and ethnic 
fractionalization for Nordic countries. Because Nordic nations are relatively socially 
homogeneous and are not immigrant countries, low social diversity does not impact much 
on the effect of welfare spending on employment. 
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Table 4A and 4B repeat analysis in Table 2A and 2B for unemployment rate. The results 
are strikingly similar. Higher welfare leads to higher unemployment rate. Table 4_1A and 
4_1B show a similar pattern for the sub-sample of Nordic countries (the only difference 
is now welfare spending on other social services is also significant). Again, Nordic 
countries are not special in terms of the economic impact of welfare expenditure on 
unemployment. 
 
Like Table 3A and 3B, for unemployment rate, welfare spending on income support and 
pension benefits does interact with ethnic fractionalization index as shown in Table 5A 
and 5B, verifying the Hypothesis D. As expected, the interaction term has the same sign 
with that of welfare variable, suggesting that ethnic diversity enhances the positive effect 
of welfare spending on unemployment.  As for the case of employment rate, the overall 
government size measured by govexp has significant main effect but not interaction 
effect with ethnic fractionalization, which is expected as total government expenditure is 
more distantly related to working incentive or business behavior than welfare spending. 
 
Like Table 3_1A and 3_1B, two estimators are not consistent for Nordic countries when 
interaction term is included, as shown in Table 5_1A and 5_1B. Only when both main 
effect and interaction are significant and two estimators give consistent results can we say 
interaction is significant, so we have no robust evidence to support the interaction effect 
between welfare spending rate and ethnic fractionalization for Nordic countries. Because 
of the difference in social heterogeneity, Nordic model, if could be taken as a success, 
may not be replicated in other countries with higher social heterogeneity. 
 
Table 6A and 6B show that welfare spending on pension benefits and public health 
services decrease labor participation rate (LPR), therefore total welfare spending rate has 
a negative effect on LPR, validating the Hypothesis C.  As the case for unemployment 
rate and employment rate, government-expenditure-to-GDP ratio has similar negative 
effect on LPR. 
 
In contrast, for Nordic countries, two estimators are not consistent for LPR as shown in 
Table 6_1A and 6_1B, suggesting that entitlement programs may not affect people’s 
decision to work or not there. This is consistent with the finding for hours worked for 
Nordic nations, implying that entitlement programs do not induce voluntary 
unemployment and disincentive effect of welfare spending in the Hypothesis A may not 
apply to Nordic countries. The mechanism of this special feature for Nordic countries is 
worth further research, social homogeneity may also play a role here. 
 
In Table 7A and 7B, two estimators are not consistent for LPR for all OECD countries 
when interaction term is included, suggesting that social heterogeneity may not have 
interaction with the effects of welfare variables in most OECD countries. Why 
employment/unemployment rate has interaction with ethnic fractionalization index while 
labor participation rate has not? One explanation could be:  the number of “fake” job 
seekers mentioned in Hypothesis A has positive correlation with social heterogeneity, 
the more diversified a society is in terms of racial, ethnic, language or cultural 
backgrounds,   the more people are likely to take advantage of the welfare system and 
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depend on other tax-payers’ support. The number of “fake” job seekers can affect 
employment rate and unemployment rate but not LPR. The reason is LPR is the ratio 
between the labor force and the overall size of their cohort (national population of the 
same age range) and the number of “fake” job seekers does not affect the size of labor 
force. When the number of “fake” job seekers increases, employment rate decreases and 
unemployment rate increases but labor participation rate does not change as the size of 
labor force remains unchanged. Because the number of “fake” job seekers has positive 
correlation with social heterogeneity, the latter also has correlation with employment rate 
and unemployment rate but not LPR. 
 
At last we test the effect of entitlement programs on business investment. Table 8A and 
8B confirm that three components of welfare expenditure: income support, pension 
benefits and health services and total welfare spending have significant negative effects 
on investment rate, supporting the Hypothesis B.  The reason that investment is depressed 
is higher cost arising from higher tax that is imposed to fund entitlement programs. So it 
is expected that government expenditure as a percentage of GDP does not affect 
investment rate as government spending does not always match taxes on labor firms pay. 
This is also verified in table 8A and 8B. 
 
Because the interaction between welfare variables and ethnic fractionalization is expected 
to be caused mainly by working incentive, social heterogeneity is not expected to affect 
business investment. This is proved by insignificant interaction terms in table 9A and 9B. 
 
Table 9_1A and 9_1B shows that in Nordic countries, firms’ investments may not be 
affected by welfare spending. Why Nordic firms are not affected by higher labor cost due 
to  entitlement  programs  needs  further  research.  As  the  previous  finding  shows  that 
welfare spending in Nordic countries has positive impact on working incentive measured 
by hours worked, an opposite case to most other OECD countries, but negative impact on 
employment rate, which is most likely due to the decrease in working opportunities 
created by firms. Unchanged investment along with decreased job opportunities may be 
caused by firms’ shift of investment from labor to technology or to overseas to save cost. 
For  example,  Sweden  is  the  country  with  the  highest  number  of  multinational 
corporations per capita in the world. In other words, entitlement programs may induce the 
firms in Nordic nations to change investment structure rather than scale to adjust for 
change in cost, which may not be employment friendly. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Two components of welfare expenditure (income support, public health service) and  the 
total welfare-to-GDP ratio have negative effect on hours worked per year per person in 
employment, supporting the hypothesis that higher welfare increases voluntary 
unemployment. On the contrary, in Nordic countries, welfare expenditure has positive 
effect on hours worked. This may be related to national cultural towards working in 
Nordic countries, it is also likely to be related to lower social heterogeneity in Nordic 
countries. 
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Three components of welfare expenditure have negative impact on employment rate and 
positive impact on unemployment rate: income support, pension benefit and public health 
service, therefore the total welfare-to-GDP ratio has a significant negative impact on 
employment rate and a positive impact on unemployment rate, supporting the Hypothesis 
that entitlement programs increase both voluntary and involuntary unemployment. 
 
The welfare spending on pension benefits and public health services decreases labor 
participation rate (LPR), therefore total welfare spending rate has a negative effect on 
LPR, validating the Hypothesis C that entitlement programs decrease labor participation 
rate. 
 
The three components  of welfare expenditure: income support, pension benefits and 
public health services and total welfare spending have significant negative effects on 
investment rate, supporting the Hypothesis B that entitlement programs increase 
involuntary unemployment by increasing labor cost to firms thus decreasing job 
opportunities by inhibiting business investments. 
 
For the effects on employment rate and unemployment rate, welfare spending on income 
support and public health services has interaction with ethnic fractionalization index: 
ethnic diversity enhances the main effects of welfare variables. 
 
In contrast, for the effect on labor participation rate, welfare spending has no interaction 
with ethnic fractionalization index. This is likely due to the fact that the number of “fake” 
job seekers has positive correlation with social heterogeneity, it  does not affect the size 
of     labor force thus labor participation rate (LPR)     but does affect 
employment/unemployment rate so that social heterogeneity does not affect LPR too. 
 
As expected, investment rate has no interaction with social heterogeneity, which mainly 
affects incentive to work, not business behavior. 
 
For the main effects of welfare variables on employment/unemployment rates, Nordic 
countries show the similar patterns as those of all OECD countries. However, in Nordic 
countries, there is no interaction between welfare variables and ethnic fractionalization 
index, which may be due to the low social heterogeneity in these five Northern European 
nations or small sample size for them. 
 
In Nordic countries, welfare spending variables are not found to have significant impact 
on labor participation rate, this finding is consistent with the positive effect on hours 
worked, suggesting that disincentive effect of welfare spending in the Hypothesis A may 
not apply to Nordic countries. 
 
The welfare spending variables are not found to have significant impact on investment 
rate in Nordic countries, which is worth further research as to why the firms in Nordic 
countries are not affected by rise in labor cost due to entitlement programs. One possible 
explanation is: entitlement programs may induce the firms in Nordic nations to change 
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investment structure rather than scale to adjust for change in cost, which is not 
employment friendly. 
 
At last, for a comparison, total government expenditure is found to have adverse impacts 
on employment rate, unemployment rate for both all OECD countries and the sub-sample 
of Nordic countries. These impacts have no significant interaction with ethnic 
fractionalization index as expected. However, the impacts on average hours worked per 
person in employment and labor participation rate are different for all OECD countries 
and the sub-sample of Nordic countries. For the former, these impacts are significantly 
negative. For the latter, they are not significant. This difference implies that in Nordic 
nations’ government expenditure, there are some elements that encourage people to work, 
which, however are not present in most of other OECD nations. As expected by our 
hypotheses, total government expenditure is found to have no significant impact on 
investment rate of businesses. 
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Table 1A: Arellano-Bond estimator for hours worked (hours) 
 
 hours hours hours hours hours hours 
L.hours 0.883 
(0.024)** 
0.898 
(0.022)** 
0.906 
(0.022)** 
0.883 
(0.023)** 
0.919 
(0.022)** 
0.827 
(0.027)** 
labor_prodg -3.241 
(0.448)** 
-3.049 
(0.460)** 
-3.247 
(0.470)** 
-3.292 
(0.447)** 
-4.412 
(0.554)** 
-3.366 
(0.497)** 
inflation -1.118 
(0.281)** 
-1.033 
(0.292)** 
-1.379 
(0.324)** 
-1.009 
(0.277)** 
-1.059 
(0.626)+ 
-1.023 
(0.282)** 
L.wageg 0.052 0.136 0.001 0.130 -0.125 0.129 
 (0.245) (0.246) (0.249) (0.243) (0.392) (0.251) 
fertility 24.974 
(9.374)** 
23.173 
(9.432)* 
27.159 
(9.449)** 
24.573 
(9.348)** 
26.476 
(9.977)** 
24.538 
(11.379)* 
labor_parti -1.802 
(0.668)** 
-1.845 
(0.673)** 
-1.650 
(0.720)* 
-1.391 
(0.654)* 
-1.097 
(0.707) 
-1.562 
(0.798)+ 
public_social -1.509 
(0.635)* 
     
income_support  -2.397 
(1.133)* 
    
pension_exp   -0.830 
(1.518) 
   
health_exp    -5.726 
(2.157)** 
  
otherwelf     -4.315 
(2.202)* 
 
govexp      -2.432 
(1.079)* 
Constant 298.794 260.438 223.949 277.798 174.912 410.259 
 (66.064)** (59.365)** (65.671)** (58.399)** (55.172)** (73.781)** 
   N  448  449  444  450  434  367   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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wor ed (hours)  
hours hours hours hours hours hours 
L.hours 0.955 0.954 0.978 0.955 0.967 0.930 
 (0.012)** (0.011)** (0.009)** (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.013)** 
labor_prodg -2.905 -2.667 -2.936 -3.073 -4.167 -2.670 
 (0.422)** (0.435)** (0.455)** (0.426)** (0.516)** (0.474)** 
inflation -0.632 -0.590 -0.661 -0.603 -0.431 -0.537 
 (0.226)** (0.233)* (0.242)** (0.229)** (0.592) (0.229)* 
L.wageg 0.321 0.352 0.480 0.275 0.085 0.450 
 (0.211) (0.219) (0.210)* (0.220) (0.373) (0.206)* 
fertility 9.956 11.154 9.818 8.976 13.827 5.889 
 (7.151) (6.963) (6.953) (7.107) (7.499)+ (8.423) 
labor_parti -0.970 -0.698 -0.767 -0.856 -0.373 -0.034 
 (0.447)* (0.456) (0.549) (0.473)+ (0.485) (0.551) 
public_social -0.866 
(0.455)+ 
     
income_support  -2.050 
(0.867)* 
    
pension_exp   0.229    
   (0.894)    
health_exp    -3.789 
(1.726)* 
  
 
 
 
Table  1B: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond  system  estimator  for  hours 
k 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
otherwelf 0.045 
(1.389) 
govexp -1.660 
(0.759)* 
Constant 132.604 106.945 60.121 130.895 53.785 148.960 
 (45.559)** (37.992)** (47.038) (39.771)** (33.983) (44.207)** 
   N  448  449  444  450  434  367   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 1_1A: Arellano-Bond estimator for hours worked (hours) estimated 
from the sub-sample of Nordic countries 
 
 hours hours hours hours hours hours 
L.hours 0.953 0.94 0.963 0.956 0.959 0.894 
 (0.043)** (0.042)** (0.045)** (0.045)** (0.043)** (0.050)** 
labor_prodg -3.287 -4.514 -4.108 -3.004 -3.008 -5.437 
 (0.818)** (0.810)** (0.765)** (0.872)** (0.840)** (1.180)** 
inflation -2.006 -1.722 -3.216 -2.539 -2.698 -3.274 
 -1.924 -1.877 (1.783)+ -1.911 -1.915 (1.701)+ 
L.wageg -2.22 -2.32 -2.49 -2.008 -1.946 -2.411 
 (0.917)* (0.866)** (0.922)** (0.920)* (0.898)* (0.977)* 
fertility 34.586 45.402 48.112 42.084 41.171 65.987 
 -23.124 (23.273)+ (24.208)* (22.736)+ (22.648)+ (27.549)* 
labor_parti -0.828 -1.495 0.062 -0.98 -0.352 -0.925 
 -1.187 -1.14 -1.292 -1.227 -1.262 -1.25 
public_social 
 
 
income_support 
1.691 
(0.811)* 
 
 
 
2.836 
    
  (1.271)*     
pension_exp 
 
 
health_exp 
  8.636 
(3.764)* 
 
 
 
1.673 
  
    (2.557)   
otherwelf     3.629  
 
 
govexp 
    (4.031)   
1.503 
      (1.832) 
Constant 36.688 99.066 -75.669 62.195 6.534 108.218 
 (131.603) (125.016) (145.64) (134.338) (136.507) (157.947) 
N 71 71 71 71 71 59 
 
 
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
21  
 
 
 
Table 1_1B: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator for hours 
worked (hours) estimated from the sub-sample of Nordic countries 
 
 hours hours hours hours hours hours  
L.hours 0.962 0.993 0.957 0.992 1.006  0.981 
 (0.021)** (0.019)** (0.025)** (0.021)** (0.017)**  (0.022)** 
labor_prodg -3.259 -4.469 -4.085 -2.790 -2.948  -5.707 
 (0.688)** (0.693)** (0.645)** (0.768)** (0.715)**  (1.049)** 
inflation -2.904 -1.592 -3.266 -2.810 -2.020  -4.559 
 (1.709)+ (1.618) (1.540)* (1.713) (1.699)  (1.349)** 
L.wageg -2.482 -2.759 -3.463 -2.737 -1.995  -2.361 
 (0.699)** (0.681)** (0.700)** (0.720)** (0.742)**  (0.741)** 
fertility 32.477 22.980 35.814 33.698 44.309  52.574 
 (17.948)+ (17.400) (17.853)* (17.526)+ (18.752)*  (21.196)* 
labor_parti -0.502 -0.803 0.801 -0.185 -0.169  -1.188 
 (0.813) (0.870) (1.000) (0.808) (0.811)  (0.941) 
public_social 2.008 
(0.564)** 
      
income_support  2.108 
(0.976)* 
     
pension_exp   5.829 
(1.913)** 
    
health_exp    2.693    
    (2.089)    
otherwelf     2.925 
(1.175)* 
  
govexp       1.484 
(0.804)+ 
Constant 2.987 16.744 -66.706 -33.370 -84.595 15.765 
 (90.148) (91.542) (97.648) (92.460) (90.298) (114.295) 
   N  71  71  71  71  71  59   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 2A: Arellano-Bond estimator for employment rate (employrate) 
 
employrate employrate employrate employrate employrate employrate 
 
L.employrate 0.888 
(0.017)** 
0.894 
(0.018)** 
0.878 
(0.018)** 
0.908 
(0.019)** 
0.896 
(0.018)** 
0.834 
(0.021)** 
labor_prodg -0.082 -0.070 -0.105 -0.098 -0.090 -0.096 
 (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.026)** (0.026)** (0.028)** 
inflation -0.011 -0.008 -0.024 -0.010 -0.004 0.044 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
long_real_r -0.086 -0.102 -0.107 -0.116 -0.109 -0.103 
 (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.021)** (0.020)** (0.022)** 
trade_open 0.053 0.064 0.078 0.075 0.083 0.037 
 (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.012)** 
popd -0.035 -0.045 -0.023 -0.022 -0.026 -0.000 
 (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.012)+ (0.012)+ (0.013)* (0.015) 
public_social -0.168 
(0.024)** 
     
income_support  -0.374 
(0.053)** 
    
pension_exp   -0.342 
(0.061)** 
   
health_exp    -0.332 
(0.091)** 
  
otherwelf     -0.031 
(0.096) 
 
govexp      -0.314 
(0.050)** 
Constant 14.459 12.931 11.415 8.865 7.902 16.885 
 (1.460)** (1.586)** (1.556)** (1.485)** (1.464)** (1.767)** 
   N  405  405  405  405  405  343   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 2B: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator for 
employment rate (employrate) 
 
employrate employrate employrate employrate employrate employrate 
 
L.employrate 0.945 
(0.009)** 
0.946 
(0.009)** 
0.921 
(0.009)** 
0.947 
(0.010)** 
0.938 
(0.011)** 
0.953 
(0.011)** 
labor_prodg -0.106 -0.098 -0.084 -0.098 -0.107 -0.098 
 (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.027)** 
inflation -0.050 -0.067 -0.045 -0.049 -0.033 -0.043 
 (0.022)* (0.022)** (0.022)* (0.022)* (0.023) (0.021)* 
long_real_r -0.066 -0.103 -0.137 -0.143 -0.133 -0.044 
 (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.019)* 
trade_open 0.027 0.033 0.025 0.022 0.030 0.024 
 (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.005)** 
popd 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)+ (0.001)* (0.001) (0.001) 
public_social -0.067 
(0.013)** 
     
income_support  -0.160 
(0.030)** 
    
pension_exp   -0.209 
(0.029)** 
   
health_exp    -0.243 
(0.070)** 
  
otherwelf     -0.004 
(0.043) 
 
govexp      -0.098 
(0.026)** 
Constant 5.147 4.012 6.572 4.886 3.861 5.029 
 (0.652)** (0.666)** (0.780)** (0.692)** (0.733)** (0.738)** 
   N  405  405  405  405  405  343   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 2_1A:  Arellano-Bond estimator for employment rate (employrate) 
estimated from the sub-sample of Nordic countries 
 
employrate employrate employrate employrate employrate employrate 
 
L.employrate 0.757 
(0.064)** 
0.684 
(0.068)** 
0.797 
(0.067)** 
0.800 
(0.074)** 
0.771 
(0.067)** 
0.725 
(0.076)** 
labor_prodg -0.127 -0.126 -0.142 -0.182 -0.150 -0.163 
 (0.062)* (0.062)* (0.064)* (0.064)** (0.065)* (0.067)* 
inflation 0.265 0.317 0.246 0.184 0.223 0.281 
 (0.086)** (0.090)** (0.088)** (0.094)* (0.089)* (0.088)** 
long_real_r -0.200 -0.219 -0.184 -0.197 -0.220 -0.303 
 (0.065)** (0.065)** (0.068)** (0.070)** (0.068)** (0.077)** 
trade_open 0.038 0.017 0.089 0.064 0.072 0.035 
 (0.047) (0.049) (0.048)+ (0.048) (0.048) (0.063) 
popd -0.195 -0.288 -0.278 -0.284 -0.328 -0.382 
 (0.121) (0.113)* (0.118)* (0.138)* (0.119)** (0.132)** 
public_social -0.245 
(0.070)** 
     
income_support  -0.412 
(0.125)** 
    
pension_exp   -1.061 
(0.329)** 
   
health_exp    -0.296 
(0.278) 
  
otherwelf     -0.256 
(0.184) 
 
govexp      -0.233 
(0.124)+ 
Constant 30.504 37.221 28.960 25.970 29.052 40.378 
 (5.716)** (6.143)** (5.918)** (6.826)** (5.967)** (7.371)** 
   N  86  86  86  86  86  76   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 2_1B: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator for 
employment rate (employrate) estimated from the sub-sample of Nordic 
countries 
 
employrate employrate employrate employrate employrate employrate 
 
L.employrate 0.852 
(0.029)** 
0.789 
(0.035)** 
0.788 
(0.033)** 
0.962 
(0.024)** 
0.955 
(0.028)** 
0.946 
(0.026)** 
labor_prodg -0.113 -0.071 -0.120 -0.126 -0.083 -0.082 
 (0.050)* (0.050) (0.051)* (0.054)* (0.053) (0.062) 
inflation 0.149 0.206 0.211 0.038 0.054 0.125 
 (0.070)* (0.071)** (0.068)** (0.071) (0.071) (0.077) 
long_real_r -0.163 -0.162 -0.182 -0.123 -0.146 -0.158 
 (0.050)** (0.050)** (0.051)** (0.052)* (0.055)** (0.064)* 
trade_open 0.057 0.013 0.056 0.069 0.093 0.111 
 (0.028)* (0.029) (0.027)* (0.029)* (0.031)** (0.037)** 
popd 0.005 0.009 0.000 -0.006 0.002 0.001 
 (0.003)+ (0.004)* (0.003) (0.003)* (0.003) (0.004) 
public_social -0.181 
(0.026)** 
     
income_support  -0.607 
(0.091)** 
    
pension_exp   -0.531 
(0.073)** 
   
health_exp    -0.631 
(0.136)** 
  
otherwelf     -0.247 
(0.071)** 
 
govexp      -0.164 
(0.054)** 
Constant 13.563 19.275 17.394 5.002 1.660 4.395 
 (2.886)** (3.519)** (3.131)** (2.382)* (2.524) (2.522)+ 
   N  86  86  86  86  86  76   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Constant 12.014 
(1.549)** 
15.181 
(1.509)** 
11.737 
(1.569)** 
8.628 
(1.493)** 
7.999 
(1.466)** 
16.944 
(1.770)** 
   N  405  405  405  405  405  343   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
Table 3A:  Arellano-Bond estimator for employment rate with interaction 
with ethnic fractionalization 
 
employrate employrate employrate employrate employrate employrate 
 
L.employrate 0.890 
(0.018)** 
0.876 
(0.018)** 
0.874 
(0.018)** 
0.909 
(0.019)** 
0.891 
(0.018)** 
0.836 
(0.021)** 
labor_prodg -0.087 -0.066 -0.107 -0.104 -0.087 -0.095 
 (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.026)** (0.026)** (0.028)** 
inflation -0.024 0.013 -0.023 -0.011 0.003 0.044 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
long_real_r -0.110 -0.083 -0.106 -0.114 -0.111 -0.102 
 (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.021)** (0.020)** (0.022)** 
trade_open 0.066 0.050 0.080 0.077 0.083 0.037 
 (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.012)** 
popd -0.022 -0.046 -0.022 -0.023 -0.024 -0.001 
 (0.012)+ (0.013)** (0.012)+ (0.012)+ (0.013)+ (0.015) 
public_social -0.141 
(0.031)** 
     
pb_ethnic -0.157 
(0.140) 
     
income_support  -0.240 
(0.069)** 
    
income_ethnic  -0.822 
(0.299)** 
    
pension_exp   -0.254 
(0.087)** 
   
pension_ethnic   -0.594 
(0.424) 
   
health_exp    -0.444 
(0.112)** 
  
health_ethnic    0.679 
(0.397)+ 
  
otherwelf     -0.167 
(0.123) 
 
otherw_ethnic     0.755 
(0.427)+ 
 
govexp      -0.362 
(0.062)** 
govexp_ethnic      0.205 
      (0.153) 
27 
Constant 5.927 
(0.646)** 
5.768 
(0.601)** 
7.629 
(0.725)** 
5.660 
(0.668)** 
4.020 
(0.716)** 
5.346 
(0.713)** 
   N  405  405  405  405  405  343   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
Table 3B: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator for 
employrate with interaction with ethnic fractionalization 
 
employrate employrate employrate employrate employrate employrate 
 
L.employrate 0.950 
(0.009)** 
0.932 
(0.008)** 
0.917 
(0.008)** 
0.946 
(0.010)** 
0.946 
(0.010)** 
0.951 
(0.010)** 
labor_prodg -0.115 -0.105 -0.091 -0.111 -0.086 -0.104 
 (0.024)** (0.023)** (0.024)** (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.027)** 
inflation -0.064 -0.041 -0.043 -0.022 -0.030 -0.036 
 (0.022)** (0.021)* (0.021)* (0.021) (0.021) (0.019)+ 
long_real_r -0.126 -0.073 -0.148 -0.161 -0.151 -0.033 
 (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.017)** (0.017)+ 
trade_open 0.021 0.018 0.020 0.014 0.017 0.022 
 (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.004)** (0.004)** 
popd -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001)* (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
public_social -0.086 
(0.013)** 
     
pb_ethnic -0.112 
(0.017)** 
     
income_support  -0.070 
(0.028)* 
    
income_ethnic  -0.377 
(0.061)** 
    
pension_exp   -0.216 
(0.027)** 
   
pension_ethnic   -0.295 
(0.058)** 
   
health_exp    -0.230 
(0.068)** 
  
health_ethnic    -0.121 
(0.053)* 
  
otherwelf     -0.038 
(0.040) 
 
otherw_ethnic     -0.119 
(0.098) 
 
govexp      -0.093 
(0.024)** 
govexp_ethnic      -0.046 
(0.018)* 
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   N  86  86  86  86  86  76   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
Table 3_1A:   Arellano-Bond estimator for employment rate with 
interaction with ethnic fractionalization estimated from the sub-sample of 
Nordic countries 
 
employrate employrate employrate employrate employrate employrate 
 
L.employrate 0.744 
(0.065)** 
0.706 
(0.069)** 
0.798 
(0.065)** 
0.807 
(0.080)** 
0.713 
(0.068)** 
0.753 
(0.079)** 
labor_prodg -0.132 -0.135 -0.150 -0.180 -0.150 -0.162 
 (0.062)* (0.063)* (0.062)* (0.065)** (0.064)* (0.067)* 
inflation 0.253 0.252 0.180 0.178 0.289 0.239 
 (0.087)** (0.099)* (0.093)+ (0.098)+ (0.089)** (0.094)* 
long_real_r -0.195 -0.267 -0.228 -0.191 -0.244 -0.269 
 (0.066)** (0.068)** (0.072)** (0.077)* (0.067)** (0.081)** 
trade_open 0.038 0.035 0.094 0.067 0.063 0.044 
 (0.047) (0.048) (0.043)* (0.050) (0.047) (0.064) 
popd -0.198 -0.251 -0.257 -0.282 -0.290 -0.369 
 (0.121) (0.116)* (0.117)* (0.140)* (0.117)* (0.133)** 
public_social -0.094 
(0.176) 
     
pb_ethnic -1.296 
(1.383) 
     
income_support  -0.276 
(0.340) 
    
income_ethnic  -0.821 
(2.463) 
    
pension_exp   -0.030 
(0.686) 
   
pension_ethnic   -9.527 
(6.307) 
   
health_exp    -0.176 
(0.632) 
  
health_ethnic    -1.494 
(7.059) 
  
otherwelf     1.202 
(0.541)* 
 
otherw_ethnic     -20.023 
(7.006)** 
 
govexp      0.216 
      (0.341) 
govexp_ethnic      -4.648 
(3.297) 
Constant 30.572 32.984 26.685 25.314 32.916 35.801 
 (5.706)** (6.703)** (5.874)** (7.553)** (5.977)** (8.083)** 
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   N  86  86  86  86  86  76   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
Table 3_1B: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator for 
employrate with interaction with ethnic fractionalization estimated from 
the sub-sample of Nordic countries 
 
employrate employrate employrate employrate employrate employrate 
 
L.employrate 0.771 
(0.031)** 
0.791 
(0.037)** 
0.771 
(0.037)** 
0.953 
(0.028)** 
0.857 
(0.031)** 
0.937 
(0.027)** 
labor_prodg -0.098 -0.056 -0.119 -0.141 -0.056 -0.098 
 (0.046)* (0.046) (0.046)* (0.052)** (0.049) (0.057)+ 
inflation 0.235 0.173 0.140 0.079 0.179 0.150 
 (0.063)** (0.071)* (0.068)* (0.066) (0.068)** (0.071)* 
long_real_r -0.164 -0.207 -0.272 -0.104 -0.166 -0.147 
 (0.046)** (0.048)** (0.046)** (0.051)* (0.050)** (0.060)* 
trade_open 0.026 0.011 0.052 0.080 0.068 0.108 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.024)* (0.027)** (0.026)** (0.036)** 
popd 0.006 0.010 -0.004 -0.006 0.009 0.002 
 (0.002)* (0.003)** (0.002) (0.003)* (0.003)** (0.003) 
public_social -0.134 
(0.023)** 
     
pb_ethnic -0.786 
(0.172)** 
     
income_support  -0.389 
(0.082)** 
    
income_ethnic  -1.330 
(0.551)* 
    
pension_exp   -0.378 
(0.074)** 
   
pension_ethnic   -1.328 
(0.600)* 
   
health_exp    -0.596 
(0.152)** 
  
health_ethnic    -0.478 
(0.855) 
  
otherwelf     -0.056 
(0.070) 
 
otherw_ethnic     -5.721 
(1.235)** 
 
govexp      -0.157 
(0.049)** 
govexp_ethnic      -0.338 
(0.242) 
Constant 21.137 18.461 18.734 5.198 10.993 5.594 
 (3.068)** (3.704)** (3.455)** (2.503)* (2.799)** (2.890)+ 
30  
 
 
 
Table 4A: Arellano-Bond estimator for unemployment rate (unemp) 
 
 unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp 
L.unemp 0.865 0.863 0.844 0.894 0.890 0.801 
 (0.020)** (0.019)** (0.021)** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.024)** 
labor_prodg 0.037 0.015 0.055 0.038 0.040 0.050 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)* (0.023)+ (0.023)+ (0.025)* 
inflation 0.060 0.034 0.064 0.043 0.049 0.008 
 (0.025)* (0.023) (0.025)* (0.024)+ (0.025)+ (0.027) 
long_real_r 0.098 0.063 0.095 0.068 0.092 0.099 
 (0.018)** (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.019)** 
trade_open -0.059 -0.042 -0.068 -0.053 -0.076 -0.038 
 (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.011)** 
popd 0.033 0.066 0.034 0.044 0.038 0.005 
 (0.010)** (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.011)** (0.012) 
public_social 0.142 
(0.023)** 
     
income_support  0.369 
(0.047)** 
    
pension_exp   0.349 
(0.057)** 
   
health_exp    0.261 
(0.078)** 
  
otherwelf     -0.070 
(0.086) 
 
govexp      0.262 
(0.046)** 
Constant -4.466 -8.279 -3.738 -5.214 -1.489 -3.180 
 (1.332)** (1.297)** (1.300)** (1.277)** (1.281) (1.537)* 
   N  402  402  402  402  402  340   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 4B: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator for 
unemployment rate (unemp) 
 
 unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp 
L.unemp 0.897 0.897 0.845 0.915 0.908 0.904 
 (0.013)** (0.012)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.015)** 
labor_prodg 0.065 0.039 0.049 0.054 0.041 0.049 
 (0.022)** (0.021)+ (0.022)* (0.022)* (0.023)+ (0.025)* 
inflation 0.063 0.050 0.022 0.043 0.024 0.039 
 (0.018)** (0.017)** (0.017) (0.018)* (0.019) (0.018)* 
long_real_r 0.121 0.056 0.139 0.086 0.133 0.086 
 (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.016)** 
trade_open -0.030 -0.025 -0.021 -0.015 -0.026 -0.020 
 (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.003)** (0.004)** (0.004)** 
popd 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001)* (0.001) (0.001) 
public_social 0.112 
(0.011)** 
     
income_support  0.237 
(0.025)** 
    
pension_exp   0.211 
(0.025)** 
   
health_exp    0.388 
(0.054)** 
  
otherwelf     0.071 
(0.033)* 
 
govexp      0.108 
(0.021)** 
Constant -1.226 -0.417 0.028 -2.008 0.758 -0.745 
 (0.321)** (0.225)+ (0.266) (0.425)** (0.267)** (0.557) 
   N  402  402  402  402  402  340   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 4_1A: Arellano-Bond estimator for unemployment rate (unemp) 
estimated from the sub-sample of Nordic countries 
 
 unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp 
L.unemp 0.718 0.579 0.831 0.839 0.809 0.779 
 (0.051)** (0.060)** (0.050)** (0.054)** (0.053)** (0.059)** 
labor_prodg -0.010 -0.026 0.016 0.059 0.023 0.030 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) 
inflation -0.163 -0.232 -0.125 -0.059 -0.095 -0.186 
 (0.058)** (0.060)** (0.060)* (0.064) (0.062) (0.065)** 
long_real_r 0.167 0.173 0.148 0.158 0.179 0.200 
 (0.045)** (0.044)** (0.047)** (0.051)** (0.050)** (0.058)** 
trade_open 0.018 0.057 -0.059 -0.026 -0.046 -0.047 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.033)+ (0.037) (0.034) (0.044) 
popd -0.049 0.006 0.138 0.099 0.182 0.209 
 (0.097) (0.089) (0.089) (0.111) (0.095)+ (0.108)+ 
public_social 0.304 
(0.054)** 
     
income_support  0.672 
(0.107)** 
    
pension_exp   1.017 
(0.238)** 
   
health_exp    0.429 
(0.199)* 
  
otherwelf     0.268 
(0.141)+ 
 
govexp      0.285 
(0.097)** 
Constant -4.799 -4.662 -8.214 -5.170 -6.131 -12.020 
 (2.796)+ (2.752)+ (2.929)** (3.176) (3.074)* (3.656)** 
   N  86  86  86  86  86  76   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 4_1B: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator for 
unemployment rate (unemp) estimated from the sub-sample of Nordic 
countries 
 
 unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp 
L.unemp 0.818 0.731 0.805 0.926 0.932 0.914 
 (0.031)** (0.038)** (0.032)** (0.029)** (0.030)** (0.031)** 
labor_prodg 0.025 -0.023 0.038 0.025 0.007 -0.002 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.045) 
inflation -0.076 -0.101 -0.056 -0.038 -0.002 -0.139 
 (0.050) (0.048)* (0.047) (0.052) (0.052) (0.055)* 
long_real_r 0.153 0.149 0.173 0.135 0.149 0.119 
 (0.038)** (0.037)** (0.039)** (0.039)** (0.041)** (0.047)* 
trade_open -0.041 0.012 -0.035 -0.041 -0.066 -0.090 
 (0.021)+ (0.020) (0.022) (0.022)+ (0.023)** (0.026)** 
popd -0.002 -0.008 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002)** (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
public_social 0.127 
(0.018)** 
     
income_support  0.474 
(0.064)** 
    
pension_exp   0.300 
(0.047)** 
   
health_exp    0.483 
(0.101)** 
  
otherwelf     0.158 
(0.054)** 
 
govexp      0.143 
(0.041)** 
Constant -0.892 -2.215 0.040 -1.692 1.546 0.426 
 (1.042) (0.979)* (1.010) (1.209) (0.997) (1.363) 
   N  86  86  86  86  86  76   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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   N  402  402  402  402  402  340   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
Table 5A: Arellano-Bond estimator for unemployment rate with 
interaction with ethnic fractionalization 
 
 unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp 
L.unemp 0.859 0.857 0.840 0.893 0.887 0.804 
 (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.021)** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.023)** 
labor_prodg 0.032 0.020 0.057 0.045 0.039 0.044 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)* (0.024)+ (0.023)+ (0.024)+ 
inflation 0.051 0.047 0.064 0.053 0.045 -0.011 
 (0.024)* (0.024)* (0.025)** (0.025)* (0.025)+ (0.026) 
long_real_r 0.070 0.090 0.092 0.095 0.092 0.077 
 (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.019)** 
trade_open -0.045 -0.051 -0.071 -0.072 -0.076 -0.023 
 (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.011)* 
popd 0.044 0.047 0.035 0.033 0.038 0.021 
 (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.011)** (0.012)+ 
public_social 0.132 
(0.027)** 
     
pb_ethnic 0.108      
 (0.121)      
income_support  0.262 
(0.060)** 
    
income_ethnic  0.879 
(0.259)** 
    
pension_exp   0.226 
(0.079)** 
   
pension_ethnic   0.830 
(0.372)* 
   
health_exp    0.210 
(0.101)* 
  
health_ethnic    -0.452 
(0.354) 
  
otherwelf     0.023  
     (0.111)  
otherw_ethnic     -0.509 
(0.381) 
 
govexp      0.302 
(0.055)** 
govexp_ethnic      -0.190 
(0.134) 
Constant -6.960 -5.643 -3.952 -1.854 -1.413 -6.064 
 (1.264)** (1.347)** (1.293)** (1.340) (1.282) (1.484)** 
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   N  402  402  402  402  402  340   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
Table 5B: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator for 
unemployment rate with interaction with ethnic fractionalization 
 
 unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp 
L.unemp 0.898 0.896 0.834 0.910 0.904 0.904 
 (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.013)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.014)** 
labor_prodg 0.065 0.047 0.061 0.052 0.026 0.042 
 (0.021)** (0.021)* (0.021)** (0.023)* (0.023) (0.024)+ 
inflation 0.055 0.073 0.025 0.028 0.017 0.021 
 (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) 
long_real_r 0.074 0.098 0.144 0.156 0.145 0.032 
 (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)* 
trade_open -0.017 -0.026 -0.020 -0.013 -0.015 -0.009 
 (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.004)** 
popd 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
public_social 0.102 
(0.010)** 
     
pb_ethnic 0.082 
(0.014)** 
     
income_support  0.229 
(0.023)** 
    
income_ethnic  0.391 
(0.053)** 
    
pension_exp   0.213 
(0.024)** 
   
pension_ethnic   0.243 
(0.049)** 
   
health_exp    0.337 
(0.055)** 
  
health_ethnic    0.028   
    (0.045)   
otherwelf     0.076 
(0.031)* 
 
otherw_ethnic     0.006  
     (0.087)  
govexp      0.097 
(0.019)** 
govexp_ethnic      0.036 
(0.016)* 
Constant -2.233 -0.515 -0.376 -1.596 0.459 -1.381 
 (0.293)** (0.205)* (0.230) (0.423)** (0.251)+ (0.509)** 
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   N  86  86  86  86  86  76   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
Table 5_1A: Arellano-Bond estimator for unemployment rate with 
interaction with ethnic fractionalization estimated from the sub-sample of 
Nordic countries 
 
 unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp 
L.unemp 0.700 0.590 0.803 0.921 0.708 0.844 
 (0.049)** (0.059)** (0.048)** (0.067)** (0.051)** (0.058)** 
labor_prodg 0.003 -0.008 0.033 0.041 0.021 0.028 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.051) (0.044) (0.049) 
inflation -0.123 -0.173 -0.079 -0.021 -0.163 -0.107 
 (0.057)* (0.066)** (0.060) (0.067) (0.057)** (0.064)+ 
long_real_r 0.146 0.158 0.191 0.107 0.203 0.132 
 (0.044)** (0.044)** (0.049)** (0.056)+ (0.044)** (0.057)* 
trade_open 0.011 0.047 -0.065 -0.055 -0.033 -0.059 
 (0.032) (0.035) (0.029)* (0.039) (0.031) (0.041) 
popd -0.041 -0.020 0.112 0.118 0.096 0.197 
 (0.093) (0.089) (0.087) (0.112) (0.087) (0.102)+ 
public_social -0.051 
(0.121) 
     
pb_ethnic 3.090 
(0.950)** 
     
income_support  0.125     
  (0.287)     
income_ethnic  3.946 
(1.932)* 
    
pension_exp   -0.680 
(0.493) 
   
pension_ethnic   17.086 
(4.541)** 
   
health_exp    -0.657 
(0.553) 
  
health_ethnic    13.100 
(6.230)* 
  
otherwelf     -1.564 
(0.383)** 
 
otherw_ethnic     25.631 
(5.068)** 
 
govexp      -0.735 
(0.253)** 
govexp_ethnic      10.419 
(2.410)** 
Constant -2.483 -2.156 -5.538 -5.085 -3.756 -7.384 
 (2.787) (2.969) (2.964)+ (3.174) (2.774) (3.603)* 
37 
   N  86  86  86  86  86  76   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
Table 5_1B: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator for 
unemployment  rate  with  interaction  with  ethnic  fractionalization 
estimated from the sub-sample of Nordic countries 
 
 unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp 
L.unemp 0.692 0.603 0.770 0.866 0.735 0.799 
 (0.032)** (0.035)** (0.035)** (0.030)** (0.032)** (0.032)** 
labor_prodg 0.015 -0.024 0.037 0.033 -0.019 0.012 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.038) (0.038) (0.033) (0.041) 
inflation -0.081 -0.120 0.003 -0.085 -0.097 -0.178 
 (0.041)* (0.040)** (0.047) (0.046)+ (0.043)* (0.047)** 
long_real_r 0.170 0.185 0.283 0.146 0.193 0.140 
 (0.033)** (0.032)** (0.038)** (0.037)** (0.034)** (0.041)** 
trade_open 0.026 0.069 -0.028 -0.035 -0.005 -0.043 
 (0.018) (0.019)** (0.020) (0.020)+ (0.019) (0.026)+ 
popd -0.006 -0.012 0.002 0.004 -0.009 -0.004 
 (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002) (0.002)* (0.002)** (0.002)* 
public_social 0.071 
(0.016)** 
     
pb_ethnic 0.820 
(0.114)** 
     
income_support  0.226 
(0.057)** 
    
income_ethnic  2.605 
(0.361)** 
    
pension_exp   0.176 
(0.056)** 
   
pension_ethnic   0.980 
(0.436)* 
   
health_exp    0.366 
(0.106)** 
  
health_ethnic    1.316 
(0.566)* 
  
otherwelf     -0.080 
(0.048)+ 
 
otherw_ethnic     6.609 
(0.820)** 
 
govexp      0.137 
(0.033)** 
govexp_ethnic      0.798 
(0.175)** 
Constant -3.102 -3.543 0.127 -1.471 -1.061 -1.940 
 (0.881)** (0.867)** (0.888) (1.021) (0.837) (1.240) 
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Table 6A: Arellano-Bond estimator for labor participation rate 
(labor_parti) 
 
labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti 
 
L.labor_parti 0.871 
(0.024)** 
0.875 
(0.024)** 
0.857 
(0.024)** 
0.888 
(0.025)** 
0.871 
(0.024)** 
0.792 
(0.029)** 
labor_prodg -0.058 -0.054 -0.068 -0.064 -0.062 -0.061 
 (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.019)** 
inflation 0.034 0.040 0.032 0.043 0.045 0.051 
 (0.021)+ (0.021)+ (0.021) (0.021)* (0.021)* (0.022)* 
long_real_r -0.052 -0.047 -0.056 -0.052 -0.059 -0.054 
 (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.014)** (0.016)** 
trade_open 0.014 0.016 0.022 0.014 0.024 0.013 
 (0.008)+ (0.008)* (0.007)** (0.008)+ (0.007)** (0.010) 
popd 0.010 0.001 0.013 0.007 0.015 0.038 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)** 
public_social -0.077 
(0.018)** 
     
income_support  -0.111 
(0.041)** 
    
pension_exp   -0.186 
(0.045)** 
   
health_exp    -0.242 
(0.067)** 
  
otherwelf     -0.091 
(0.071) 
 
govexp      -0.187 
(0.038)** 
Constant 7.998 7.773 7.711 7.194 5.583 11.472 
 (1.330)** (1.369)** (1.365)** (1.329)** (1.286)** (1.645)** 
   N  391  391  391  391  391  329   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table  6B:  Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond  system  estimator  for  labor 
participation rate (labor_parti) 
 
labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti 
 
L.labor_parti 0.968 
(0.009)** 
0.960 
(0.010)** 
0.946 
(0.010)** 
0.967 
(0.009)** 
0.973 
(0.011)** 
0.976 
(0.012)** 
labor_prodg -0.062 -0.058 -0.062 -0.067 -0.067 -0.055 
 (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.019)** 
inflation -0.009 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.008 -0.010 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
long_real_r -0.041 -0.033 -0.060 -0.046 -0.056 -0.032 
 (0.012)** (0.013)* (0.012)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.014)* 
trade_open 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.011 
 (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)* (0.003)* (0.003)* (0.003)** 
popd -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
public_social -0.024 
(0.010)* 
     
income_support  -0.010 
(0.022) 
    
pension_exp   -0.135 
(0.024)** 
   
health_exp    -0.122 
(0.045)** 
  
otherwelf     -0.008 
(0.028) 
 
govexp      -0.052 
(0.018)** 
Constant 2.515 2.550 4.416 2.867 1.668 2.467 
 (0.645)** (0.633)** (0.806)** (0.617)** (0.664)* (0.713)** 
   N  391  391  391  391  391  329   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table  6_1A: Arellano-Bond estimator  for  labor  participation rate 
(labor_parti) estimated from the sub-sample of Nordic countries 
 
labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti 
 
L.labor_parti 0.761 
(0.071)** 
0.750 
(0.069)** 
0.757 
(0.068)** 
0.700 
(0.090)** 
0.741 
(0.070)** 
0.762 
(0.079)** 
labor_prodg -0.154 -0.166 -0.143 -0.160 -0.151 -0.144 
 (0.047)** (0.046)** (0.045)** (0.044)** (0.045)** (0.049)** 
inflation 0.069 0.059 0.084 0.079 0.083 0.070 
 (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.066) (0.074) 
long_real_r -0.083 -0.091 -0.071 -0.099 -0.094 -0.133 
 (0.046)+ (0.046)* (0.046) (0.046)* (0.045)* (0.056)* 
trade_open 0.012 0.019 0.008 0.020 0.011 0.007 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.042) 
popd -0.127 -0.156 -0.090 -0.225 -0.128 -0.110 
 (0.092) (0.082)+ (0.087) (0.115)+ (0.083) (0.099) 
public_social -0.030 
(0.058) 
     
income_support  0.034     
  (0.093)     
pension_exp   -0.471 
(0.264)+ 
   
health_exp    0.215   
    (0.239)   
otherwelf     -0.151 
(0.142) 
 
govexp      -0.096 
(0.095) 
Constant 21.118 21.729 22.020 26.578 22.592 22.572 
 (5.910)** (5.800)** (5.764)** (7.913)** (5.885)** (7.292)** 
   N  82  82  82  82  82  72   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 6_1B: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator for labor 
participation rate (labor_parti) estimated from the sub-sample of Nordic 
countries 
 
labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti 
 
L.labor_parti 0.911 
(0.027)** 
0.944 
(0.027)** 
0.861 
(0.037)** 
0.973 
(0.020)** 
0.966 
(0.023)** 
0.978 
(0.020)** 
labor_prodg -0.112 -0.093 -0.105 -0.151 -0.116 -0.116 
 (0.037)** (0.039)* (0.037)** (0.038)** (0.040)** (0.044)** 
inflation 0.069 0.033 0.071 0.044 0.052 0.050 
 (0.057) (0.056) (0.054) (0.059) (0.060) (0.067) 
long_real_r -0.038 -0.065 -0.039 -0.054 -0.065 -0.106 
 (0.039) (0.039)+ (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.049)* 
trade_open 0.030 0.014 0.031 0.040 0.042 0.056 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.020) (0.021)+ (0.022)+ (0.027)* 
popd -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)* (0.002)* (0.002) (0.003) 
public_social -0.086 
(0.025)** 
     
income_support  -0.125 
(0.074)+ 
    
pension_exp   -0.289 
(0.077)** 
   
health_exp    -0.291 
(0.110)** 
  
otherwelf     -0.114 
(0.057)* 
 
govexp      -0.079 
(0.042)+ 
Constant 6.853 4.110 9.846 2.215 1.301 1.941 
 (2.529)** (2.605) (3.057)** (1.723) (1.863) (1.899) 
   N  82  82  82  82  82  72   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table  7A: Arellano-Bond  estimator  for  labor  participation  rate  with 
interaction with ethnic fractionalization 
 
labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti 
 
L.labor_parti 0.871 
(0.024)** 
0.871 
(0.024)** 
0.854 
(0.024)** 
0.887 
(0.024)** 
0.866 
(0.025)** 
0.789 
(0.029)** 
labor_prodg -0.058 -0.053 -0.066 -0.068 -0.060 -0.060 
 (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.019)** 
inflation 0.035 0.039 0.030 0.041 0.047 0.052 
 (0.021)+ (0.021)+ (0.021) (0.021)* (0.021)* (0.022)* 
long_real_r -0.052 -0.047 -0.049 -0.050 -0.053 -0.054 
 (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.016)** 
trade_open 0.014 0.015 0.019 0.016 0.021 0.012 
 (0.008)+ (0.008)+ (0.007)** (0.008)* (0.007)** (0.010) 
popd 0.009 0.003 0.010 0.006 0.012 0.039 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)** 
public_social -0.079 
(0.023)** 
     
pb_ethnic 0.015      
 (0.100)      
income_support  -0.085 
(0.052) 
    
income_ethnic  -0.180 
(0.216) 
    
pension_exp   -0.170 
(0.064)** 
   
pension_ethnic   -0.131 
(0.318) 
   
health_exp    -0.332 
(0.082)** 
  
health_ethnic    0.557 
(0.294)+ 
  
otherwelf     -0.131 
(0.093) 
 
otherw_ethnic     0.237  
     (0.311)  
govexp      -0.231 
(0.047)** 
govexp_ethnic      0.182 
      (0.114) 
Constant 7.989 7.731 8.546 7.091 6.281 11.663 
 (1.334)** (1.370)** (1.379)** (1.328)** (1.296)** (1.651)** 
   N  391  391  391  391  391  329   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 7B: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator for labor 
participation  rate  (labor_parti)  with  interaction  with  ethnic 
fractionalization 
 
labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti labor_parti 
 
L.labor_parti 0.966 
(0.009)** 
0.957 
(0.009)** 
0.940 
(0.010)** 
0.967 
(0.009)** 
0.977 
(0.010)** 
0.973 
(0.011)** 
labor_prodg -0.065 -0.062 -0.057 -0.071 -0.062 -0.063 
 (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.017)** (0.019)** 
inflation -0.004 0.006 0.001 0.011 0.007 -0.017 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
long_real_r -0.046 -0.033 -0.055 -0.051 -0.049 -0.024 
 (0.012)** (0.013)** (0.012)** (0.013)** (0.012)** (0.013)+ 
trade_open 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.012 
 (0.002)** (0.003)** (0.002) (0.002)+ (0.003)* (0.003)** 
popd -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
public_social -0.026 
(0.009)** 
     
pb_ethnic -0.027 
(0.012)* 
     
income_support  -0.002 
(0.020) 
    
income_ethnic  -0.130 
(0.047)** 
    
pension_exp   -0.130 
(0.022)** 
   
pension_ethnic   -0.074 
(0.042)+ 
   
health_exp    -0.105 
(0.044)* 
  
health_ethnic    0.004   
    (0.040)   
otherwelf     -0.016 
(0.026) 
 
otherw_ethnic     -0.099 
(0.071) 
 
govexp      -0.058 
(0.017)** 
govexp_ethnic      -0.024 
(0.014)+ 
Constant 2.965 2.919 4.984 2.995 1.653 2.888 
 (0.641)** (0.603)** (0.770)** (0.593)** (0.634)** (0.685)** 
   N  391  391  391  391  391  329   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 8A: Arellano-Bond estimator for investment rate (invrate) 
 
 invrate invrate invrate invrate invrate invrate 
L.invrate 0.838 0.831 0.832 0.848 0.835 0.773 
 (0.022)** (0.023)** (0.022)** (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.022)** 
inflation -0.032 -0.036 -0.016 -0.024 -0.015 0.007 
 (0.019)+ (0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
long_real_r -0.073 -0.070 -0.083 -0.080 -0.078 -0.089 
 (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.019)** 
L.gdpg 0.180 0.198 0.187 0.193 0.213 0.245 
 (0.026)** (0.025)** (0.026)** (0.026)** (0.025)** (0.024)** 
public_social -0.088 
(0.026)** 
     
income_support  -0.164 
(0.045)** 
    
pension_exp   -0.186 
(0.063)** 
   
health_exp    -0.229 
(0.086)** 
  
otherwelf     -0.025 
(0.086) 
 
govexp      -0.025 
(0.036) 
Constant 5.689 4.654 5.243 4.978 3.889 4.885 
 (0.736)** (0.566)** (0.684)** (0.658)** (0.543)** (0.860)** 
   N  535  537  535  535  535  605   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 8B: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator for investment 
rate (invrate) 
 
 invrate invrate invrate invrate invrate invrate 
L.invrate 0.870 0.851 0.876 0.875 0.880 0.807 
 (0.018)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.018)** 
inflation -0.027 -0.011 -0.027 -0.025 -0.012 0.009 
 (0.015)+ (0.018) (0.014)+ (0.015)+ (0.015) (0.014) 
long_real_r -0.068 -0.081 -0.083 -0.068 -0.063 -0.095 
 (0.020)** (0.019)** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.016)** 
L.gdpg 0.179 0.207 0.175 0.205 0.208 0.235 
 (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.021)** (0.019)** 
public_social -0.055 
(0.015)** 
     
income_support  -0.086 
(0.031)** 
    
pension_exp   -0.134 
(0.030)** 
   
health_exp    -0.145 
(0.065)* 
  
otherwelf     -0.020 
(0.042) 
 
govexp      -0.021 
(0.022) 
Constant 4.322 3.882 4.047 3.880 2.883 4.229 
 (0.570)** (0.485)** (0.475)** (0.570)** (0.453)** (0.628)** 
   N  535  537  535  535  535  605   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 9A: Arellano-Bond estimator for investment rate with interaction 
with ethnic fractionalization 
 
 invrate invrate invrate invrate invrate invrate 
L.invrate 0.836 0.831 0.830 0.844 0.831 0.774 
 (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.022)** 
inflation -0.034 -0.039 -0.027 -0.019 -0.013 0.006 
 (0.022) (0.023)+ (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
long_real_r -0.089 -0.066 -0.093 -0.080 -0.078 -0.090 
 (0.021)** (0.022)** (0.021)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.019)** 
L.gdpg 0.179 0.194 0.177 0.190 0.214 0.245 
 (0.027)** (0.025)** (0.026)** (0.026)** (0.025)** (0.024)** 
public_social -0.094 
(0.033)** 
     
pb_ethnic 0.064      
 (0.131)      
income_support  -0.095 
(0.058) 
    
income_ethnic  -0.472 
(0.248)+ 
    
pension_exp   -0.403 
(0.096)** 
   
pension_ethnic   0.986 
(0.341)** 
   
health_exp    -0.418 
(0.118)** 
  
health_ethnic    0.766 
(0.324)* 
  
otherwelf     -0.085 
(0.106) 
 
otherw_ethnic     0.296  
     (0.310)  
govexp      0.001 
      (0.048) 
govexp_ethnic      -0.112 
(0.136) 
Constant 5.361 4.861 5.059 5.060 3.967 4.887 
 (0.775)** (0.576)** (0.693)** (0.656)** (0.549)** (0.861)** 
   N  535  537  535  535  535  605   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 9B: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator for investment 
rate with interaction with ethnic fractionalization 
 
 invrate invrate invrate invrate invrate invrate 
L.invrate 0.866 0.852 0.870 0.873 0.875 0.805 
 (0.018)** (0.019)** (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.019)** (0.017)** 
inflation -0.018 -0.017 -0.020 -0.020 -0.010 0.007 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
long_real_r -0.090 -0.078 -0.100 -0.062 -0.064 -0.090 
 (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.015)** 
public_social -0.051 
(0.014)** 
     
pb_ethnic -0.012 
(0.016) 
     
L.gdpg 0.177 0.205 0.175 0.207 0.207 0.236 
 (0.021)** (0.021)** (0.022)** (0.021)** (0.021)** (0.019)** 
income_support  -0.086 
(0.029)** 
    
income_ethnic  -0.026 
(0.058) 
    
pension_exp   -0.131 
(0.030)** 
   
pension_ethnic   0.055    
   (0.056)    
health_exp    -0.172 
(0.064)** 
  
health_ethnic    0.025   
    (0.054)   
otherwelf     -0.033 
(0.039) 
 
otherw_ethnic     0.111  
     (0.104)  
govexp      -0.025 
(0.020) 
govexp_ethnic      -0.000 
(0.015) 
Constant 4.177 3.898 3.909 3.966 2.916 4.325 
 (0.559)** (0.470)** (0.472)** (0.544)** (0.442)** (0.610)** 
   N  535  537  535  535  535  605   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table  9_1A: Arellano-Bond  estimator  for  investment  rate  (invrate) 
estimated from the sub-sample of Nordic countries 
 
 invrate invrate invrate invrate invrate invrate 
L.invrate 0.828 0.827 0.843 0.829 0.733 0.716 
 (0.086)** (0.084)** (0.084)** (0.083)** (0.091)** (0.088)** 
inflation 0.115 0.188 0.143 0.180 0.189 0.137 
 (0.139) (0.124) (0.134) (0.136) (0.132) (0.124) 
long_real_r -0.148 -0.067 -0.156 -0.174 -0.131 -0.196 
 (0.105) (0.114) (0.104) (0.104)+ (0.102) (0.107)+ 
L.gdpg 0.387 0.383 0.326 0.321 0.398 0.341 
 (0.098)** (0.089)** (0.097)** (0.088)** (0.083)** (0.086)** 
public_social 0.061      
 (0.114)      
income_support  -0.001 
(0.130) 
    
pension_exp   -0.335 
(0.462) 
   
health_exp    -0.369 
(0.289) 
  
otherwelf     0.645 
(0.257)* 
 
govexp      0.181 
      (0.167) 
Constant 2.469 3.967 5.652 6.198 1.899 1.032 
 (2.998) (1.853)* (3.032)+ (2.473)* (1.765) (4.074) 
   N  92  94  92  92  92  89   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
49  
 
 
 
 
Table 9_1B: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator for 
investment rate (invrate) estimated from the sub-sample of Nordic 
countries 
 
 invrate invrate invrate invrate invrate invrate 
L.invrate 0.870 0.840 0.832 0.826 0.851 0.751 
 (0.018)** (0.062)** (0.056)** (0.062)** (0.061)** (0.064)** 
inflation -0.027 0.177 0.147 0.198 0.163 0.155 
 (0.015)+ (0.096)+ (0.092) (0.109)+ (0.099)+ (0.095) 
long_real_r -0.068 -0.033 -0.162 -0.139 -0.172 -0.170 
 (0.020)** (0.093) (0.077)* (0.080)+ (0.080)* (0.082)* 
L.gdpg 0.179 0.430 0.347 0.389 0.378 0.348 
 (0.022)** (0.071)** (0.064)** (0.070)** (0.066)** (0.066)** 
public_social -0.055 
(0.015)** 
     
income_support  -0.070 
(0.080) 
    
pension_exp   -0.163 
(0.077)* 
   
health_exp    -0.087 
(0.170) 
  
otherwelf     0.035  
     (0.089)  
govexp      -0.009 
(0.068) 
Constant 4.322 3.819 4.590 3.917 2.954 4.707 
 (0.570)** (1.389)** (1.308)** (1.745)* (1.387)* (2.334)* 
   N  535  94  92  92  92  89   
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Appendix 1 The variable definitions, data sources and time coverage of data 
 
variable Definition Data source Time coverage 
fertility Fertility rate: Number of children born to 
women aged 15 to 49 
OECD 
Factbook 
 
1970-2010 
govexp Government expenditure as % of GDP WDI2010 1960 - 2010 
health_exp Public social expenditures on Health as a 
percentage of GDP 
SOCX  
1980 - 2007 
hours Average hours actually worked: 
Hours per year per person in employment 
OECD 
Factbook 
2010 
 
 
 
1980 - 2012 
income_support Public  social  expenditures  on  income 
support  to  the  working-age  population 
as % GDP 
SOCX   
 
1955 - 2010 
inflation Inflation  rate:  Consumer  price  indices 
(CPI): annual growth in percentage 
OECD 
Factbook 
2010 
 
 
 
1955 - 2008 
invrate Investment rate: the share of total GDP 
that  is  devoted  to  investment  in  fixed 
assets 
OECD 
Factbook 
2010 
 
 
 
1976 - 2006 
L.gdpg One-year  lagged  value  of  GDP  growth 
rate 
WDI2010  
1961-2005 
l.wageg One-year lagged value of growth rate of 
labor compensation  per unit labour input 
OECD 
Factbook 
 
1967-2008 
labor_parti Labor participation rate   
 
labor_prodg 
 
Labor productivity growth rate 
OECD 
StatExtracts 
 
1990 - 2011 
long_real_r long   real   interest   rate   :The   nominal 
returns on long-term government bond 
minus the actual inflation rate over the 
following year 
  
 
 
 
1955 - 2008 
otherwelf Welfare spending on other social services 
as percentage of GDP 
SOCX  
1955 - 2010 
pension_exp Public  social  expenditures  on  pension 
as % GDP 
SOCX  
1980 - 2010 
 
popd Population density (people per square km of land area) 
 
WDI2010 
 
1961 - 2010 
public_social Public Social Expenditure as percentage 
of GDP 
SOCX  
1980 - 2010 
Trade_open International trade openness (% of GDP) WDI2010 1960 - 2008 
unemp Unemployment rate OECD 
Factbook 
 
1955 - 2010 
Note: WDI2010: World Development Indicator 2010 Edition, World Bank. SOCX: The 
OECD Social Expenditure Database 
